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UNRECORDED CONDITIONAL SALE-TIME OF
BUYER'S CREDITOR'S RELIANCE
Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co.'
During December, 1937 B established a line of credit
and began a running account with C. A day or two prior
to February 11, 1938, B ordered by telephone from C merchandise in the amount of $14.23. February 11, 1938, S
claimant-appellee delivered a refrigerator case to B under
the terms of a conventional conditional sale contract. February 12, 1938, the merchandise which B ordered from C
was delivered to B. February 17, 1938, the contract of conditional sale was recorded. September 27, 1938, petition
putting B into bankruptcy was filed. C filed a claim in
bankruptcy in a total amount of $164.73, for balance due
on deliveries of merchandise between December 16, 1938
and February 22, 1938, on which, however, there was only
one delivery ($14.23 above) between February 11 and
February 17. Of the total purchase price of the refrigerator case of $786.25, there remained due S at the time of
bankruptcy $534.25. S filed a claim for repossession of
the refrigerator case, and this was opposed by appellant,
who is the trustee in bankruptcy, on the theory that C,
who is claiming in bankruptcy, is a subsequent creditor
who became such between the time of the delivery of the
refrigerator case and the date of the recording of the contract of conditional sale, so that under the Maryland statute' requiring recordation of a conditional sales contract
1 104 Fed. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
2 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 21, Sec. 55:
"Every note, sale or contract for the sale of goods and chattels, wherein
the title thereto, or a lien thereon, is reserved until the same be paid in
whole or in part, or the transfer of title is made to depend upon any condition therein expressed and possession is to be delivered to the vendee,
shall, in respect to such reservation and condition, be void as to third
parties without notice until such note, sale or contract be in writing,
signed by the vendee, and be recorded in the Clerk's office of the Superior
Court of Baltimore City, or in the Clerk's office of the Circuit Courts of
the various counties, as the case may be, where the vendee resides, or
in the case of a corporate or partnership vendee, then where such vendee
has its principal place of business in the State of Maryland; and such
recording shall be sufficient to give actual or constructive notice to third
parties when a memorandum of the paper writing signed by the vendee
or vendees, setting forth the date thereof, the amount due thereon, when
and how payable and a brief description of the goods and chattels therein
mentioned shall have been recorded with the Clerk aforesaid, but it shall
not be necessary that said paper writing shall be acknowledged or an
affidavit made to the consideration therein expressed as in the case of
bills of sale."

1939]

FRIEDMAN v. REFRIGERATOR CO.

83

C (because of S's failure to record) is protected and should
have priority over the claim of conditional vendor. The
District Court held that within the contemplation of the
recording statute as construed by the Maryland Court of
Appeals, C was a prior creditor and allowed S to recover
the refrigerator case from the bankrupt estate. On an
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals by the trustee in
bankruptcy the decree of the lower court was reversed.
If the contract between B and C for merchandise and
the delivery of the merchandise were both made after the
installation of the refrigerator case and before recordation of the contract of conditional sale, then there would
seem to be little doubt that under Federal decisions and
their construction of the Maryland law the merchandise4
creditor should prevail as against the conditional vendor.
The Court in its opinion indicates that there was nothing
in the facts of the case under discussion to show that the
delivery of the merchandise was not the act evidencing
acceptance, which meant the contract was made after the
installation of the refrigerator case.
On the other hand, if the contract between B and C
for merchandise and the delivery of the merchandise were
both made before the installation of the refrigerator case
then there would likewise seem to be little doubt that
the conditional vendor would prevail, because of the rule
that the recording statutes are only for the protection of
subsequent creditors, which rule was enunciated in Gunby
v. Motor Truck Corp.5
But, if the contract between B and C for merchandise
were made before the installation of the refrigerator case
and the merchandise were delivered in the interim between
the installation of the refrigerator case and the recording
of the contract of conditional sale then we have a situation which apparently heretofore has not been passed upon
in construing the Maryland statute (except with possibly
one incidental exception to which reference is made below). Research fails to reveal any decisions in other jurisdictions on this point. Even if such decisions were available they would be of little assistance as authority because the recording statutes of different states vary in
a In re Wilhelm, 25 Fed. Supp. 440 (D. C. Md. 1938).
4 In re Rosen, 23
Fed. (2d) 687 (D. C. Md. 1928); In re Shipley, 24
Fed. (2d) 991, 83 A. L. R. 1288 (D. C. Md. 1928) ; Enterprise Fuel Co. v.
Jones, 99 Fed. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); Arnold, Conditional Sales
of Chattels in Maryland (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 187, 199 et seq.
- 156 Md. 19, 142 A. 596 (1928) ; Arnold, supra n. 4, 198 et 8eq.
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their provisions and in the way in which they should be
construed. Text writers, also, apparently have not considered this particular problem.
That a complete contract was made when B ordered
the merchandise over the telephone from C may well have
been the actual situation in the case under discussion. The
Court does not indicate with certainty just when the contract was made because in view of its decision it considered
this determination as immaterial. The Circuit Court of
Appeals said:
"The learned judge below held to the contrary, on
the theory that the crucial date in determining the
status of the creditor was that on which the credit
was agreed upon rather than that upon which the goods
were delivered; but we find no authority for such distinction and we do not think it sound. The creditor's
claim for goods sold and delivered, which is the claim
upon which he relies, does not arise until the delivery of the goods; and, in making the delivery upon
which such claim arises and parting with title to the
goods delivered, he is a 'third person without notice',
whom it was the purpose of the statute to protect.
The fact that delivery may have been made in accordance with a pre-existing contract is immaterial;
for, notwithstanding such contract the seller could
protect himself, if doubtful of the solvency of the purchaser, by refusing delivery or asserting a seller's lien.
See Williston on Sales, pp. 879-883. Only upon delivery does he lose power to protect himself with respect to the goods sold, and it is clear that his status
as a creditor, entitled to protection under the statute,
must be judged as of that date. It does not appear
in this case, however, that delivery was made under
a pre-existing contract. It is true that an order for
the goods was telephoned to the creditor two or three
days before their delivery; but there is nothing to
show that it resulted in a binding contract of sale until acceptance was evidenced by delivery. The fact
that a line of credit had been established prior thereto is immaterial, as the creditor could have ceased
furnishing goods under the line of credit at any time.
It was likewise immaterial that there was a running
account between the parties; for each order for goods
became a separate and independent contract when ac-
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cepted, and, with respect to the conveyance, the seller
became a subsequent creditor as to items delivered
after its execution .... "
This view of making the decisive date the time of delivery and not the time the contract is made raises some
very interesting questions. For example, B, as vendee, is
in possession of a valuable chattel under a conditional sale
contract which is unrecorded. C, without any actual knowledge of the conditional sales contract, makes a contract
with B agreeing to deliver goods to B in thirty days. After
this contract is made, but before delivery, S, the conditional vendor, records the contract so that at the time of
delivery C has constructive notice. In a contest between
C and S, who will prevail? If the time of delivery is the
decisive date, clearly S should. If S prevails, then it would
seem that C has the onerous duty of searching the records
at the time the contract is made to see if he will enter into
the contract giving credit, and again at the time of delivery if he is to be very cautious. Or suppose after the
contract is made between B and C, but before delivery,
C learns of the recordation, would C be justified in refusing performance on the ground that he entered into the
contract giving credit in reliance on the chattel, there being no evidence at delivery date of B's insolvency? Another example, what will be the result if under a contract
between B and C the latter is to make delivery in installments and S records after delivery of the first installment?
Will S prevail over C as to subsequent deliveries and if
so, does it not make it incumbent on C to search the records before delivery of each installment? This might not
be a troublesome problem in bankruptcy,' but it well might
6 The Court in its opinion referred to the bankruptcy rule that when
under Secs. 67a and 70e of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended
(under the Chandler Act merged in Sec. 70e), claims, which for want
of record are not valid liens as against claims of certain creditors of
the bankrupt, are not liens against the estate; or when the trustee avoids
any transfer 'by the bankrupt which any creditor might have avoided,
then a lien or transfer which is void as against one or some creditors, but
not all of the creditors of the bankrupt, may be avoided in toto by the
trustee in bankruptcy for -the benefit of all the creditors claiming in bankruptcy. Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4, 76 L. Ed. 133, 52 S. Ct. 3, 76 A. L. R.
1198 (1931) ; In re Moore, 11 Fed. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); In re
Rosen, 23 Fed. (2d) 687 (D. C. Md. 1928). That this rule sometimes occasions what is tantamount to a windfall for all the creditors claiming
in bankruptcy is well illustrated by the principal case under discussion
where because one creditor with a claim of only $14.23 could attack the
conditional vendor's lien the bankrupt estate was able to recover an asset Worth several hundred dollars for the benefit of all the creditors
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be if C issues an ordinary execution. Another example,
while B is in possession of a chattel under an unrecorded
contract of conditional sale C enters into a contract to
supply work and labor which will require several weeks
to perform. The day after C starts work S records the
contract. Will S be protected as against C for any claims
arising out of C's labor subsequent to recordation, and if
so, does it not make it incumbent on C to search the records each day before starting work?
While it may be true that "the seller could protect himself, if doubtful of the solvency of the purchaser, by refusing delivery or asserting a seller's lien", it would seem
to be more in accord with the realities of the situation to
assume that the seller has already satisfied himself as to
the buyer's solvency at the time the contract selling the
merchandise on credit is made. Subsequent insolvency
or bankruptcy of the buyer is probably the rare exception and not the rule, and even if it does ensue it may not
develop for weeks or months after the creditor has delivered his merchandise. And certainly it would seem that
if the contract giving credit has been made, the seller of
the merchandise would not be justified in refusing performance merely because the buyer does not subsequently
acquire possession of a chattel under an unrecorded coneven though the latter, in the absence of bankruptcy, could not have attacked the validity of this lien. While this rule may be supported on
the ground of convenience in administering the bankrupt estate, to some
persons it may seem most inequitable.
It would seem that the conditional vendor, after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, cannot protect his lien by paying off the claim of
the creditor and thereby eliminate the basis on which the lien is avoided.
The Supreme Court, in Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268,
275, 60 L. Ed. 275, 286, 36 S. Ct. 50, 54 (1915), has said: "When not otherwise specially provided, the rights, remedies, and powers of the trustee
are determined with reference to the conditions existing when the petition is filed. It is then that the bankruptcy proceeding is initiated, that
the hands of the bankrupt and of his creditors are stayed, and that his
estate passes actually or potentially into the control of the bankruptcy
court."
It is quite possible that such a payment might be treated as a crime
under Sec. 29b of the Bankruptcy Act which provides: "A person shall
be punished by imprisonment for a period of not to exceed five years
or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or both, upon conviction of the offense
of having knowingly and fraudulently . . . (5) received or attempted to
obtain any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof from any person, for acting or forebearing
to act in any proceeding under this Act." Sec. 1 (23) of the Bankruptcy
Act provides "'Persons' . . . when used with reference to the commission
of acts which are forbidden under this Act shall include persons who are
participants in the forbidden acts ....
The conditional vendor's solution to all these difculties is, as suggested by the Court in the principal case, prompt recording.
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tract of conditional sale of which the seller knew nothing at the time the contract was made and if the seller
refused performance on such grounds he would subject
himself to damages for breach of contract.
Perhaps there is a clew to what construction the Court
of Appeals may give to the Maryland recording statute
in the event that it is appealed to to decide a case similar
to the one under discussion. In Gunby v. Motor Truck
Corp.' certain creditors of a conditional vendee sought to
execute on a truck of which the vendee was in possession
under an unrecorded contract of conditional sale. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the creditors were pre-existing creditors and hence could not prevail over the conditional vendor and at the end of the opinion the Court said
this:
"Nor can we accede to the view of appellants (creditors), strongly pressed, that because defendants (creditors) permitted interest to accrue, or the debts to
remain uncollected, after the date of the contract of
sale, their claims were thereby taken out of the class
of pre-existing debts."
There would seem to be some analogy between a contract for the purchase of goods before the conditional sale,
with delivery after the conditional sale, and the incurring
of a debt before the conditional sale, with the creditor permitting the debt to run on with interest accruing after
the conditional sale.
In conclusion, it would seem that having only one decisive date to determine whether or not a creditor of the
conditional vendee is to have priority over a conditional
vendor, and making this decisive date the day the contract is made between the conditional vendee and the creditor and not the day of performance by the creditor, would
tend toward greater certainty and less confusion.
Supra n. 5.

